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INTRODUCTION

The recent failure of Congress to reauthorize the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) 1 caused considerable legal controversy over the continued validity and operation of the EAA's Export Administration Regulations (Regulations).2 Through these
Regulations, the Commerce Department (Commerce) controls the
export of nonmilitary goods and technologies 3 to foreign nations
and limits the participation of United States persons and companies in boycotts and other restrictive trade practices imposed by
foreign nations against Israel and other nations allied with the
United States.
While the business community has criticized various aspects of
the export controls and foreign boycott restrictions established
1. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982). Author's Note: Subsequent to submittal of this article for publication, Congress has enacted the Export Administration Admendments Act of 1985 ("Act"), Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985),
which reauthorizes the EAA. By its terms, however, the Act is set to expire on
September 30, 1989. Act, §120 (amending EAA, § 20). Thus, the problems resulting from the EAA's lapse discussed in this article very well may recur when
Congress is again faced with renewing the Act in 1989. For an overview of the
Act, see Harris and Bialos, CongressionalBalancingAct Benefits Exporters,VII
Legal Times of Washington No. 9, at 17-21 (Aug. 5, 1985).
2, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399.2 (1984).
3. The export of military goods and technologies is regulated by the State
Department under the International Traffic In Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§
121-130.33 (1984), pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. 22 U.S.C. §§ 25712796c (1982). These controls are not affected by the lapse of the EAA. For a list
of other export controls not authorized under the EAA, and therefore not affected by its lapse, see infra note 117.
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under the EAA, the Commerce Department's regulatory system
nevertheless has provided a relatively stable framework for overseas transactions. The legality of the Regulations was relatively
clear,4 their applicability to a multitude of transactions fairly predictable, and the process for administering them well-established.
This stability was largely due to the requirements and guidelines
contained in the EAA itself, which mandated that the Commerce
regulate exports and boycott-related practices in a particular
manner and limited Commerce's discretion in numerous respects.
However, this cocoon of legality and stability was recently removed because after two years of debate, Congress failed to
reauthorize the EAA.5 Faced with the lapse of this important ena4. See, e.g., United States v. Brumage, 377 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(sustaining the EAA against various constitutional challenges).
5. The 98th Congress began its unsuccessful efforts to reauthorize the EAA
early in 1983, with the introduction of various proposals to reauthorize and
amend the EAA. See H.R. 381, H.R. 483, H.R. 1197, H.R. 1564, 1565 & 1566,
H.R. 2278, H.R. 2281, H.R. 2500, H.R. 2671, S. 397, S. 407, S. 434, and S. 979,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
After extensive hearings and markup sessions in the spring of 1983, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs produced a "clean" bill, H.R. 3231, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983), incorporating features from all competing House Proposals. See
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1983, H.R. REP. No. House Comm.
on For. Aff. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Committee favorably reported
H.R. 3231 to the full House, which after extensive debates, passed the bill on
October 19, 1983.
Similarly, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs incorporated major provisions of pending Senate bills into a "clean" version of S.
979, and favorably reported the new S. 979 to the full Senate on May 25, 1983.
See The Export AdministrationAct Amendments of 1983, S. REP. No. 170, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983). The Senate passed S. 979, with amendments, on March
1, 1983.
The House and Senate reauthorization bills, which sharply diverged on numerous important aspects of export controls, were referred to a Joint HouseSenate Conference. After seven months of work, the Conference had resolved
nearly all of these differences. In the last days of the 98th Congress, however,
the Conference broke down, failing to reach agreement on the following key issues: the role of the Defense Department in reviewing export licenses applications; and the nature of controls on exports and other transactions involving
South Africa.
Section 10-g of the Senate bill (S. 939) would have given the Defense Department the authority to review any proposed exports (including so-called "westwest" exports to noncommunist nations) that had a "clear risk" diversion to
proscribed nations. The House bill had no identical provision. The Administration opposed the Senate proposal because it wanted the flexibility to allocate
these bureaucratic resources. See 130 CONG. REc. H. 12147 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
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bling statute,6 President Reagan was forced to reauthorize the
1984).
Controversy also enveloped a House proposal that would have systematically
restricted various transactions with South Africa. Specifically, Section Title I
of the House bill established, inter alia: (1) mandatory fair employment standards for United States firms operating in South Africa (known as Sullivan
Principles) (H.R. 3231, §§ 311, 312); (2) that no bank operating under United
States law may make any loan directly, or through a foreign subsidiary, to the
South African Government, or any corporation, partnership or other organization owned or controlled by that Government (H.R. 3231, § 321); and (3) that,
subject to certain exceptions, no United States person could make any investment, including establishing or making a loan or other extension of credit, in
South Africa. The Senate bill had no similar provision.
The Conference failed to reach a compromise on either provision. See 130
CONG. REc. S14335 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). A final post-conference attempt at

compromise also failed. As reflected in a bill passed by the Senate on October
10, 1984, (See 130 CONG. REc. S14083 (Oct. 10, 1984)), the Senate offered to drop
its insistence on Defense Department review of "west-west" exports if the House
agreed to delete the export controls over bank loans to South Africa. See 130
CONG. REc. H12117, 12128-12130 (Oct. 11, 1984) (setting forth text of Senate
amendment to H.R. 4230) and 130 CONG. REc. S12147 (Oct. 11, 1984) (Remarks
of Sen. Garn (D-Utah). The House rejected this compromise proposal and, instead, passed an amended version of H.R. 4230 (see 130 CONG. REC. H1213112146 (Oct. 11, 1984)) (setting forth text of House amendments), which deleted
the Senate proposal on Defense Department review and reinserted the Housesponsored South African sanctions. See 130 CONG. REC. S14335 (Oct. 11, 1984)
(Remarks of Sen. Garn (D-Utah)). The Senate laid this bill aside for the remainder of the session, thereby ending all attempts to reauthorize the EAA during
the 98th Congress. See 130 CONG. REC. S14449 (Oct. 11, 1984).

6. The recent statutory lapse period began on March 30, 1984, only after
several extensions of the EAA, an earlier lapse of the EAA, and a resulting declaration of emergency. The EAA was originally to expire on its own terms on
September 30, 1983. EAA § 20, 50 U.S.C. § 2419 (1982). On September 30, Congress' continued debate over the statute's reauthorization prompted it to amend
the EAA by extending its life until October 14, 1983. See Pub. L. 98-108, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). On October 14, 1983, however, Congress let the EAA
lapse. In response, the President declared an international economic emergency
and maintained the existing Regulations pursuant to IEEPA. Exec. Order No.
12444, 48 Fed. Reg. 48215 (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in 19 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES.

Doc. 1436 (1983).
Thereafter, on December 5, 1983, Congress reinstated and extended the EAA
until February 29, 1984. Pub. L. 98-207, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also
Exec. Order No. 12451 (Dec. 20, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 56563 (Dec. 22, 1983) (rescinding Presidential declaration of emergency set forth in Exec. Order No.
12444, supra, reprinted in 19 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1722-23 (1983)). On the
expiration date, Congress again extended the EAA until March 30, 1984. P.L.
98-222, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). On March 30, 1984, the EAA again expired.
The President again declared an international economic emergency and contin-
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Regulations on the basis of the amorphous "emergency" powers
granted him under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).7 By executive order, the President declared that a "national emergency" existed by virture of the
EAA's lapse and, therefore, continued the Commerce Department's Regulations in force in order to respond to the declared
emergency."
This Article examines whether the President's reauthorization
of the Regulations is within the scope of the authority provided
by IEEPA and explores the potential long term consequences of
"life under IEEPA" for the United States system of export and
boycott-related controls.
Section I analyzes whether the President's emergency powers
under the IEEPA permit the maintenance of regulations originally promulgated under a statute that has since lapsed (i.e. the
EAA). The Article demonstrates that when Congress promulgated
the IEEPA, Congress expressly evinced its intent to give the
President broad emergency authority to regulate exports and boycott-related practices during periods of the EAA lapse. Although
there are serious doubts whether the lapse of the EAA rises to the
level of an "unusual and extraordinary" threat to the national security, foreign policy, or the economy of the United States sufficient to allow the President to invoke the emergency powers
under the IEEPA, the courts' traditionally have been unwilling to
review the validity of such Presidential determinations of an
emergency. Thus, when the Regulations are maintained under the
IEEPA during periods of EAA lapse, they nevertheless should be
considered valid.
Section II analyzes how the shift from the EAA to the IEEPA
can affect the basic structure of United States export controls and
boycott-related restrictions. It then examines the consequences of
these changes for both businesses subject to the Regulations and
for Congress, which traditionally has exercised a major role in the
regulation of exports. Although Congress narrowly structured the

ued the existing Regulations pursuant to IEEPA. Exec. Order No. 12470 (Mar.
30, 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 13099 (Apr. 3, 1984), reprinted in 20 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 452-53 (1984). On March 28, 1985, when the declared emergency ended, the President continued the emergency and maintained in effect the regulations under the IEEPA. See 50 Fed. Reg. 12513 (Mar. 29, 1985).
7. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
8. Exec. Order No. 12470 (Mar. 30, 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 13099 (1984).
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EAA to provide a long-term framework for export and boycottrelated controls, the broadly worded IEEPA does not contain
such requirements or guidelines that limit the scope of the Administration's discretion. Thus, under the guise of his emergency
powers, the President can safely ignore the requirements and
standards of the lapsed EAA, and unilaterally restructure the
Commerce Department's Regulations for the duration of the
emergency. While the IEEPA permits greater judicial review of
Commerce Department actions than did the EAA, such lawsuits
rarely succeed in reversing the Commerce Department's decisions
and cannot limit the President's discretion to reshape United
States export controls and boycott-related restrictions in an
emergency. Thus, a lengthy EAA lapse, like the recent one, allows
the President to exercise unilateral emergency authority under
the IEEPA, resulting in: (1) an unstable regulatory environment
for international business transactions; and (2) an eclipse of the
traditional role of Congress in structuring export controls.
This article concludes by urging that when the EAA has lapsed,
Congress should immediately reauthorize this important enabling
statute in order to provide a more predictable regulatory environment for United States exporters and to reclaim its plenary authority in the regulation of foreign commerce. Moreover, with
possible future lapses of the EAA in mind, Congress also should
amend the IEEPA to require the maintenance of the Regulations
without material change during future periods of lapse.
II.

THE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE EXPORTS AND
BOYCOTT-RELATED PRACTICES IN AN EMERGENCY

The IEEPA authorizes the President to declare a "national
emergency" to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security, foreign policy, or the economy of the United
States, 9 and sets forth specific responses that the President may
invoke to respond to and resolve the declared national emergency. 10 While Congress enacted the IEEPA to limit the President's peacetime emergency powers," it is established herein that
the statute nevertheless authorizes the President to control both
exports and boycott-related practices pursuant to a declaration of
9. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)-(b) (1982).
10. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982).
11. See infra note 20.
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"national emergency."
A. The Breadth of the President's Emergency Authority
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
The President's executive order of March 30, 1984 maintained
the Regulations in force on the basis of Title II of the IEEPA,
which expressly permits the President, upon a declaration of national emergency, the power to:
regulate ... prevent or prohibit, any... exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to,
or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
2
States.1
Like other grants of power involving foreign affairs, the President's emergency powers under Title II have been broadly construed.13 Recognizing that Congress intended the IEEPA to endow the President with the flexibility to respond successfully to
national emergencies within constitutional parameters, the courts
14
have rarely invalidated an executive action based on the IEEPA.
When construed in this light, Title II also should be read to permit the President's maintenance of the Regulations during peri-

ods of EAA lapse.
The broad language of Title II, on its face, appears to authorize
the President's action. The statutory references to the regulation

12. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
13. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 672 (1981) (In upholding the
President's authority under IEEPA to nullify judicial attachments levied against
Iran and various Iranian entities and to oust United States courts of jurisdiction
over such cases, the Court noted that "the legislative history and cases ... fully
sustain the broad authority of the Executive when acting under this congressional grant of power"). See also Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, No. 831371, slip op. at 16 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 1984) (quoting South Puerto Rico Sugar
Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965) (Congressional authorizations of presidential power
involving foreign affairs "should be given a broad construction and not 'hemmed
in or cabined, cribbed, confined' by anxious judicial blinders.").
14. One of the rare exceptions to this deference is Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d
557 (5th Cir. 1975) (invalidating as arbitrary a provision in the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations that permitted a freeze on the assets of a deceased Cuban
national because the deceased still had "an interest" in his estate), reh'g denied,
510 F.2d 557, reh'g denied en banc, 514 F.2d 738 (1975).
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of "exportation" and other property transactions affecting foreign
"interests" encompass both the Regulations' export controls and
restrictions on foreign boycott-related practices within the President's powers under the IEEPA.
The history of Title II confirms its applicability to export controls. The President invoked the IEEPA's predecessor statute,
Section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (Enemy
Act), 15 as the basis for maintaining the Regulations on at least
four earlier occasions of EAA lapse."6 In United States v. Spawr
Optical Research Inc.,1 7 several defendants who had been convicted for the unlicensed export of laser mirrors to the Soviet
Union during a period of EAA lapse challenged the President's
use of Section 5(b) to maintain the validity of the Regulations. In
upholding the President's use of the Enemy Act, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the express delegation in [Section] 5(b) to
the President was broad and enabled him to regulate, prevent or
prohibit the exportation of any property to any foreign country.
The unambiguous wording of the statute clearly shows that the
President's actions were in accordance with the power Congress
delegated."' 8
Although Congress limited the scope of the President's peacetime emergency powers when it promulgated the IEEPA in
1977,19 it did not repudiate this particular use of the President's
15. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1982).
16. See Exec. Order No. 11940, 41 Fed. Reg. 43407 (1976); Exec. Order No.

11810, 39 Fed. Reg. 35567 (1974); Exec. Order No. 11796, 39 Fed. Reg. 27891
(1974); Exec. Order No. 11677, 37 Fed. Reg. 15483 (1972).

17. 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983).
18. 685 F.2d at 1081, n.10. See also United States v. Yoshida International,

Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding that the President can broadly
regulate imports under Section 5(b) of the Enemy Act).

19. Title II does not include the following powers, which were available to
the President under Section 5(b) of the Enemy Act: (1) the power to take title to
foreign property; (2) the power to regulate purely domestic transactions; (3) the
power to regulate gold or bullion; and (4) the power to seize records. Trading

With The Enemy Act Reform Legislation, H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1977).
General provisions of IEEPA also limit the emergency powers conferred on
the President under Title H by requiring the President to, inter alia: (1) consult
with Congress prior to and during the exercise of emergency powers, 50 U.S.C. §
1703(a) (1982); (2) transmit a report to Congress on the use of such powers, 50
U.S.C. § 1703(b) (1982); and (3) comply with the procedures for exercising emergency powers set forth in the National Emergency Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(d)

(1982), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1651(b) (1982).
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emergency authority. To the contrary, Congress expressly authorized the President to use Title II to keep the Regulations' export
controls and restrictions on boycott-related practices in effect
during periods of EAA lapse.
A review of the IEEPA's legislative history reveals that, Congress heard considerable testimony concerning the established
practice of using Section 5(b) of the Enemy Act to maintain the
Regulations of the EAA during lapse periods.2 0 To solve the lapse
problem, the administration proposed during Committee debate
that Congress make the EAA a permanent statute. However, Congress rejected this proposal, concluding that "such important regulatory legislation should be periodically reviewed."'" In maintaining the EAA's temporary status, Congress thus consciously
chose to perpetuate the lapse problem that had continuously
plagued the statute's reauthorization.
At the same time, however, Congress also rejected a proposal to
repeal Section 5(b) of the Enemy Act and, instead, incorporated
its operative language wholesale into Title II of the IEEPA as the
basic authorization for the President's peacetime use of emergency powers.2 2 In so doing, Congress clearly indicated that Title
II of the IEEPA could serve as a statutory backstop in the event
of an EAA lapse: "Should a lapse occur. . the authority of title
II of this bill could be used to continue the Export Administration Regulations in effect if, and to the extent that, the President

20. See Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions,
Hearings Before House Comm. on Int'l Rel. Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Pol'y &
Trade, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Statement of Prof. Maier, at 23-24) (Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Julius L. Katz, at 99-100) (Statement of
Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Dept. of Commerce, at 122-23)
[hereinafter referred to as Hearings].
21. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 13.
22. See Revision of Trading With the Enemy Act, Markup Before House
Comm. on Int'l Rel., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Remarks of Comm. Chairman
Jonathan B. Bingham noting that the emergency powers provided by Title H of
IEEPA "are substantially the same as those granted in the Enemy Act") [hereinafter referred to as Markup].
Administration witnesses specifically cited the use of Section 5(b) to maintain
the EAA Regulations during EAA lapse periods as a major argument in favor of
retaining the provision. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 124 (Statement of Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Deputy General Counsel Dept. of Commerce, at 123-24) (Prepared Statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, at
106-07).
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declared a national emergency as a result of such lapse .... -23
Thus, Congress has clearly expressed its intention that the President should use the peacetime emergency powers provided by the
IEEPA to maintain both the export controls and boycott-related
restrictions established by the Commerce Department pursuant
to the EAA during periods of EAA lapse.2 4
B.

The Lapse of the EAA as a "National Emergency"

Although Title II of the IEEPA grants the President the authority to establish export and boycott-related controls, the President may declare a "national emergency" and exercise this authority only in the face of an "unusual and extraordinarythreat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside of the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States .
-.25 The IEEPA expressly states that the
President may not exercise the emergency authority "for any

other purpose. "26
Congress intended that this requirement of a real emergency
serve as a "substantive restriction" on the "breadth. . .and...
availability" of the powers delegated to the President by the
IEEPA.2 7 As a House report, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation (Trading with the Enemy Report), states, the
"unusual and extraordinary" threat requirement "stems from a
recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief,
and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems. A national emergency should be declared and emergency authority
employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances

23. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 13. See also InternationalEmergency Economic Powers Legislation, S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1977); Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d at 1081 (noting that "Congress
again conferred on the President the rule-making authority necessary to.maintain the [EAA] regulations").
24. The Commerce Department's foreign boycott restrictions probably are
also authorized by an alternative delegation of authority in IEEPA, which provides that the President may "regulate or prohibit ... any transactions in foreign exchange, . . . [and] transfers of credit or payments between, by, through,
or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of a foreign country or a national thereof." 50 U.S.C. §
1702(a)(1)(A) (1982). See Scalia Letter, infra note 44, at M-2.
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1982).
27. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 10.
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which constitute a real emergency .. ."28
In an attempt to meet this "real" emergency requirement, the
March 30, 1984 executive order invoking the IEEPA states that:
the unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations constitute, in light of the
expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy
and economy of the United States."29
Yet, whether the IEEPA's "real emergency" requirement in fact
has been met, is not free from doubt.
The mere reiteration of statutory language in an executive order designed to fulfill that statute's requirements hardly resolves
the issue of whether the lapse of the EAA constitutes an "unusual
and extraordinary threat" to United States interests sufficient to
invoke the President's emergency powers under the IEEPA.
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the problem of unrestricted
access to strategic goods and technology that results from the
EAA's lapse is "unusual and extraordinary" or "rare and brief."
To the contrary, the "leakage" of United States products and
technology is the very recurring and predictable problem that
prompted Congress to promulgate the EAA in the first place. 30
Congress itself highlighted the nonemergency nature of the export leakage problem in 1977 when it shifted the authority to regulate exports outside the United States from the Enemy Act to
the EAA. As then stated by Congress, "this is neither a wartime
nor an emergency authority, and it belongs in the nonemergency
statutory context of the [EAA]. 31
It is also uncertain that the lapse of control over foreign boycott-related practices constitutes an "unusual and extraordinary"
threat to United States interests. While the President, at least,
can justify the exercise of emergency export controls on the
ground that the absence of such controls would probably result in
transfers of strategic goods and technologies detrimental to
United States national security, foreign policy, and economic interests, no such urgent justification requires the President to
28. Id.

29. Exec. Order No. 12470 (Mar. 30, 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 13099 (1984), reprinted in 20 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 452 (1984).
30. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 17.
31. Id.
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maintain the EAA's boycott-related controls. 32 Although compliance by United States business concerns with foreign boycotts
perpetrated against United States allies clearly would be inconsistent with United States foreign policy interests and, perhaps,
would run counter to the international obligations of the United
States, such boycott-related conduct by United States nationals
would not result in irreparable harm to United States interests. 3
That the EAA itself did not prohibit compliance with foreign
boycotts until 1976 underscores the nonemergency nature of this
problem. In short, the absence of controls over both exports and
boycott-related practices appears to be a "normal,
ongoing prob34
lem" rather than one that is rare and unusual.
Notwithstanding these serious doubts over whether the EAA's
lapse creates a "real" emergency, a reviewing court probably
would conclude that the President's determination of an "unusual
and extraordinary threat" to United States interests is a "political question" immune from judicial review. Under this doctrine of
judicial abstention, the federal judiciary will not adjudicate
claims that require an inquiry into the conduct of United States
foreign policy because, under the Constitution, such foreign policy matters fall exclusively within the province of the executive
and legislative branches. 5 A judicial inquiry into the validity of a
32. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 123 (statement of Homer E. Moyer, Jr.,
Deputy General Counsel, Dept. of Commerce) (noting that "[t]he transfer of
strategic technology during a temporary lapse in export control authority could
result in an irretrievable loss, for a one-time acquisition of strategic technology
could obviously provide the basis for unlimited production of strategic commodities in the future").
Administration officials testifying before Congress at the time of IEEPA's enactment offered no similar urgency for the maintenance of the EAA's foreign
boycott restrictions during its lapse.
33. The only rationale offered by the President in support of maintaining the
boycott-related controls is that the lapse of such controls "would seriously harm
our foreign policy interests, particularly in the Middle East." Continuation of
Export Control Regulations, PresidentialMessage To Congress (Mar. 30, 1984),
supra note 29, reprinted in 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 453 (Apr. 2, 1984).
Neither the President's Executive Order nor his accompanying Message to Con-

gress offer any evidence of irreparable injury which would result from the lapse
of these controls.
34. The lapse of a domestic regulatory statute like the EAA also may not
constitute a threat "which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982).
35. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Holmes v. Laird, 459
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President's determination that an emergency exists under the
IEEPA is precisely the type of inquiry that the political question
doctrine is designed to prevent; it would allow the courts to second-guess the President's determination of a threat to United
States foreign policy, national security, or economic interests, and
thereby interfere with the executive branch's ability to flexibly
respond to perceived threats.
In short, by steadfastly exercising substantial deference toward
the President's emergency determinations under the Enemy Act
and the IEEPA, 6 the courts have ceded the power to define international emergencies to the executive branch. Thus, whatever the
wisdom of the President's decision to characterize the EAA lapse
as a "national emergency," this determination must be regarded
as a verity.
C.

Emergency Export Controls: A "Rational" Response to the
Lapse of the EAA

Although unwilling to examine the validity of a President's determination that a "national emergency" exists, the courts nevertheless will inquire into whether the actions undertaken in response thereto are "rationally related to the national
emergenc[y] invoked. 3 7 However, this judicially-imposed limitation on a President's emergency powers under the IEEPA is easfly met. Having allowed the President to define an EAA lapse as
an "unusual and extraordinary" threat to significant United
States interests, the courts can hardly conclude that the President's use of emergency powers to maintain the United States export controls and boycott-related restrictions in force is an irrational response to this perceived threat. If the "termination" or
"temporary lapse" of the EAA threatens United States interests
by permitting unrestricted exports of strategic goods and compliance by United States persons with foreign boycotts of United
States allies, 8 the President's use of the IEEPA to extend the

F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
36. See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 989 (1966); Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 579.
37. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d at 1081 (emphasis added). Accord Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 579, n.29.
38. Continuation of Export Control Regulations, PresidentialMessage to
the Congress (Mar. 30, 1984), supra note 29, reprinted in 20 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 453-54 (Apr. 2, 1984).
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EAA Regulations over such international business transactions is
the most rational solution to this "national emergency." 9
D. The IEEPA's Limitations on Emergency Powers Do Not
Render Invalid Specific Sections of the Commerce Regulations
Assertions that specific portions of the Commerce Department
Regulations lie outside the scope of the President's Title II emergency powers are also without merit. The limitations that the
IEEPA places on the President's emergency powers do not disturb the validity of any of the Commerce Department export controls and boycott-related restrictions maintained thereunder.
1. The Foreign Interest Requirement
One of the Title II limitations on the President's emergency
powers is that actions taken by the7 President must relate to
"property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest.

' 40

As the New Jersey District Court recently ob-

served, "[t]he term 'any interest' must be defined in the broadest
sense and includes any interest whatsoever, direct or indirect." 41
In other words, under the IEEPA, the President may regulate economic transactions involving the most indirect foreign interest,
but the President cannot "regulate purely domestic transaction[s]. ' ' 42 This broadly construed requirement thus does not disturb the validity of any of the EAA Regulations maintained
under the IEEPA,43 all of which apply to transactions involving
at least some foreign interest, however indirect or remote. 44
39. See Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d at 1081 (holding that "President Ford's effort to limit the exportation of strategic items [under the Enemy
Act] clearly had a rational relationship to the prevention of aggression and

armed conflict").
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
41. Behring Int'l Inc. v. Miller, 504 F. Supp. 552, 557 n.8 (D.N.J. 1980)
(quoting United States v. Quong, 303 F.2d 499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
863 (1962)). See also Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3034, reh'g denied, 105 S.
Ct. 285 (1984).
42. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 15.
43. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia to J.T.
Smith, General Counsel, Dept. of Commerce ("Scalia Letter") (Sept. 29, 1976),
reprinted in U. S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) (Oct. 19, 1976) (opining that the En-

emy Act provided the President with the authority to maintain the Commerce
Department's foreign boycott provisions during lapses of the EAA.)
44. For example, although the Commerce Department Regulations restrict
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2.

The IEEPA JurisdictionalLimitation

Another Title II limitation on the President's emergency powers is its jurisdictional provision, under which the President may
regulate only persons and property "subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. '45 Because the EAA contains the identical jurisdictional provision,4 6 the Commerce Department's Regulations
must be considered valid under the IEEPA to the extent that
they are authorized by the EAA.
The broad scope of United States jurisdiction under the IEEPA
and the EAA includes the authority to regulate numerous extraterritorial export transactions. Prior to the enactment of the
IEEPA, Section 5(b) of the Enemy Act served as the statutory
basis for those aspects of the Regulations that control the re-exportation of non-United States-origin commodities and technology by foreign subsidiaries of United States concerns.47 The President found it necessary to regulate these extraterritorial
transactions pursuant to the Enemy Act because the statutory
predecessors to the EAA only permitted the President to prohibit
or curtail exports "from the United States. '48 However, when
promulgating the IEEPA, Congress amended the EAA to cover
these extraterritorial transactions, thereby eliminating the need
to regulate them on a permanent basis under the President's
emergency powers. 49 At the same time, Congress clearly indicated
its intent that "[e]xport controls of this kind could be implemented in future emergencies under the authority of. . . [T]itle
II" of the IEEPA. 0 Thus, to the extent that the EAA Regulations
reach extraterritorial transactions like re-exports, 51 Congress

the release of technical data in the United States, the restrictions only apply to
releases made with the "knowledge or intent that the data will be shipped or
transmitted" out of the U.S. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b)(1)(ii) (1984). This export
control has a sufficiently foreign connection, even though indirect, to meet
IEEPA's "foreign interest" requirement.
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
46. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2405(a)(1) & 2406(a)(1) (1982).
47. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 17.
48. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841
(1969) (emphasis added); Export Control Act of 1949, Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949).
49. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 17.
50. S. REP. No. 466, supra note 23, at 6.
51. While current United States export controls have extraterritorial applications (see 15 C.F.R. §§ 374, 379 (1984) (regulating re-export of goods and technologies by United States and foreign persons)), the foreign boycott-related re-
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plainly has given the President the authority to maintain them
under the IEEPA during periods of EAA lapse.2
3.

The Personal Communications Exemption

The IEEPA's blanket prohibition on the emergency regulation
of "any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal commu-

nication, which does not transfer any thing of value

' 53

does not

disturb the validity of the Regulations' restrictions on either the
provision of boycott-related information or the export of technical
data.
Specifically, the EAA Regulations provide that no United
States person may furnish boycott-related information to boycotting nations concerning: (1) the race, sex, or national origin of
any United States person, or of any owner, officer, director, or
employee of any corporation or other organization that is a
United States person;5 4 (2) the person's own or any other person's
past, present, or proposed business relationships with boycotting
nations, businesses, nationals, and residents thereof, or persons
blacklisted by boycotting nations; 55 and (3) the membership, affiliation, or contributions of any other person to a charitable or fra-

strictions largely do not. Their jurisdictional reach is limited to boycott-related
conduct by United States persons, which the Commerce Department has defined
to include United States residents, nationals, and "controlled in fact" foreign
subsidiaries, affiliates, and other permanent foreign establishments of domestic
concerns. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b)(1) (1984).
52. This is not to say that there are no limits whatsoever on the extraterritorial reach of United States jurisdiction under IEEPA and the EAA. By calling
for assertions of jurisdiction to be limited where they impinge on the important
national interests of foreign nations, principles of international comity lend considerable support to the curtailment of the extraterritorial exercise of United
States jurisdiction under federal regulatory statutes. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Address by the Honorable Kenneth W. Dam to the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 15, 1983);
THE UNITED STATES

RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

§ 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). See also Moyer & Mabry,

Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues,
and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 J. L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1, 112-114
(suggesting that the jurisdictional reach of the EAA and IEEPA should be limited in accordance with principles of international law).
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1) (1982).
54. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(c)(1) (1984).
55. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(1) (1984).
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ternal organization which supports a boycotted nation.56
While the Regulations thus prohibit overseas "communication"
they nevertheless are valid because the IEEPA expressly exempts
from regulation only "personalcommunications which do not involve the transfer of anything of value. ' 57 In contrast, the Regulations focus exclusively on communications that concern commercial relationships or occur in a commercial setting.5 s
Moreover, a boycotting nation's receipt of boycott-related information plainly can be interpreted as a transfer of something "of
value" (i.e., of information that could possibly assist them in enforcing boycotts against nations friendly to the United States and
against persons who support or have business dealings with boycotted nations. Therefore, the use of the broadly-worded IEEPA
to maintain in force the restrictions on boycott-related conduct
does not violate the IEEPA limitations.
For similar reasons, the President's use of emergency powers to
maintain the Commerce Department's restrictions on the export
of technical data also should be considered valid. These Regulations apply only to overseas communications that contain technical data, which is defined to include "information of any kind
that can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production,
manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials."5 9 Technical information used in a manufacturing or production process plainly does not qualify as a "personal communication" exempt from regulation under the IEEPA because it is
clearly commercial in nature and is often transferred in international economic transactions. Such data is also clearly "of value"
not only in a commercial sense, but also in its potential national
security significance-which is the very reason why Congress restricts exports of technical data. Thus, the regulation of technical
data exports under IEEPA does not affect their validity.6 0

56.
57.
58.
"with

15 C.F.R. § 369.2(e)(1) (1984).
H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 15 (emphasis added).
The prohibitions on furnishing boycott-related information only apply
respect to a United States person's activities in interstate or foreign com-

merce of the United States. . .

."

15 C.F.R. § 369.2(c)(4) (1984) (emphasis

added). See also 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(2)(i) (1984) (noting that the regulation
applies where the information being furnished pertains to various business
relationships).

59. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1984).
60. The exemptions from EAA technical data restrictions ensure that personal communications of no commercial or military value will remain unregu-

88

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 18.71

4. Recordkeeping, Reporting & Enforcement Powers
Finally, challenges to the reporting requirements, recordkeeping requirements, enforcement procedures, and most of the penalties established by the EAA Regulations appear to lack a legal
basis because Title II of the IEEPA expressly allows such ancillary functions to be exercised with respect to export controls and
boycott-related restrictions. The emergency power to "investigate" and "regulate" in Title II encompasses the power to conduct necessary proceedings."' The IEEPA also contains a separate
provision that grants the President the authority to: (1) "require
any person to keep a full record of, and to furnish under oath, in
the form of reports or otherwise," information relevant to regulated transactions; and (2) "require the production of any books
of account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda or other papers" in the custody of a regulated person.6 2 This IEEPA provision clearly authorizes all reporting requirements in the EAA
Regulations6 3 and allows the Commerce Department to subpoena
or otherwise obtain discovery of necessary documents in the
course of an enforcement action pursuant to the Regulation.
The IEEPA's criminal and civil penalties are very similar to
those established under the EAA Regulations. The only difference
between the two is that the IEEPA sanctions are less severe.6 5
Thus, to the extent that the EAA Regulation penalties are more
severe than the IEEPA penalties, 66 they are invalid.
lated. The Commerce Department specifically excludes technical data in the
public domain, scientific data not "directly and significantly related to design,
production, or utilization in industrial processes," and educational data transmitted through instruction in academic settings. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3 (1984).
61. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982); Scalia Letter, supra note 43.

62. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
63. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.68, 387.13 (1984).

64. See 15 C.F.R. § 388.9 (1984).
65. Maximum fines of $10,000 for a civil violation, and maximum fines of
$50,000, or a jail sentence of ten years, or both, for a willful violation.
66. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(3) (1984) (providing civil fines of $100,000
for each violation involving national security controls); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(ii)
(1984) (providing criminal fines up to five times the value of the exports, or
$1,000,000, whichever is greater, for violations of national security and foreign
policy controls by persons other than individuals, and fines up to $250,000 for
individuals).
It should also be noted that IEEPA penalizes only willful and nonwillful viola-

tions, but the Regulations also provide an intermediate set of criminal penalties
for "knowing" violations. See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(1)(i) (1984). Because IEEPA
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The only penalties among the EAA enforcement tools that the
IEEPA does not expressly authorize are administrative denial orders, which suspend or revoke a subject person's export privileges
for either an indefinite or specified period.6 7 Temporary denial orders, issued on an ex parte basis, will summarily deny the export
privileges of alleged violators upon a showing that the order will
facilitate the enforcement of the EAA Regulations. 8 Temporary
denial orders have proven very successful in aiding Commerce
Department efforts to obtain necessary information from alleged
violators during enforcement proceedings. Permanent denial orders, on the other hand, are issued against persons who the Commerce Department has determined have violated the Regulations.
An argument can be made that the IEEPA, on its face, does not
authorize such denial orders. Although the IEEPA expressly permits the President to establish criminal and civil fines, it does not
explicitly authorize the permanent denial of export privileges.
Similarly, the IEEPA expressly provides for administrative discovery and reporting requirements, but does not explicitly authorize the temporary denial of export privileges as an enforcement tool in administrative proceedings. It is thus arguable that
by expressly providing the Commerce Department with a host of
penalties and administrative enforcement devices, Congress intended to withhold from the President the authority to use unmentioned sanctions-including denial orders.
Under the broader judicial view of the President's emergency
powers,6 9 however, the courts would probably find that the
IEEPA authorizes denial orders, not as sanctions and enforcement devices, but as prohibitions on exports. In this regard, Title
II provides the President with the expansive authority to "prevent or prohibit. . . any. . . exportation of ... any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any

does not provide for mid-level liability and penalties, this portion of the Regulations also should be considered invalid. Under IEEPA, "knowing" violations
must be treated as either civil violations subject to IEEPA's lesser civil sanctions, or, if willfulness can be proven, criminal violations subject to its greater
criminal sanctions.
67. See 15 C.F.R. § 388.3 (1984) (permanent denial orders); 15 C.F.R. §
388.19 (1984) (temporary denial orders).
68. 15 C.F.R. § 388.19(2) (1984).
69. See Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), and
discussion thereof in Section I(A), supra.
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70

In summary, both Congress and the courts have sanctioned the
presidential regulation of exports and boycott-related practices
during a "national emergency" prompted by the EAA

lapse-Congress, by granting the President broad powers under
Title II of the IEEPA to respond to emergencies and the judiciary, by its refusal to scrutinize presidential emergency determinations that the EAA lapse creates an "unusual and extraordinary
threat" to United States interests.7 1 Thus, when the EAA Regulations are maintained under the IEEPA during periods of EAA
lapse, regulated businesses should consider appropriate measures
to comply therewith.

III. THE SHAPE OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS AND
BOYCOTT-RELATED RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE IEEPA
The valid maintenance of the Regulations under the President's Title II emergency powers for an extended period of time
raises the serious prospect of major alterations being made in the
basic structure of United States export controls and boycott-related regulations. Such changes, which the President can impose
unilaterally pursuant to the IEEPA during EAA lapse periods,
can affect significantly the regulatory climate for businesses engaged in international transactions and can undermine the traditional role of Congress in structuring United States export
70. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982) (emphasis added).
71. Notwithstanding the lapse of the EAA and the President's invocation of

IEEPA, Congress continued to appropriate funds for the administration and enforcement of the Commerce Department's system of export controls and boycott-related regulations. See Fiscal 1985 CongressionalBudget Submission (requesting $22,749,000 for administration and enforcement of export controls by
the Commerce Department's International Trade Administration (ITA)); HR.
REP. No. 802, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1984) (noting approval of entire ITA
request, with exceptions not here relevant); Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State and the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985,
P.L. 98-411, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (enacting appropriation sought by ITA
for export control functions during periods when Regulations are maintained
pursuant to IEEPA). Congressional appropriation during the recent lapse period
further indicates Congressional acquiescence in, and approval of, the President's
use of IEEPA to regulate exports and boycott-related conduct when the EAA
has lapsed.
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controls.
A. Presidential Discretion to Restructure Export Controls
During an Emergency
As noted at the outset, the Commerce Department has based
its regulatory framework for overseas transactions, to a large extent, on the requirements, guidelines, and statements of policy in
the EAA. 2 Thus, the crucial issue is whether the President can
utilize the emergency power under the IEEPA to make major
structural changes in export controls and boycott regulations-and, in the process, legally disregard the EAA's limitations
on executive discretion.
In promulgating the IEEPA, Congress was deeply concerned
with the breadth of the President's discretion in exercising emergency authority. The Trading With the Enemy Report notes that
section 5(b) of the Enemy Act" had a "history of expansive use of
emergency powers" and, "through usage and amendment, had become an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at [the President's] discretion, broad powers in ... the in'74
ternational economic arena without congressional review.
Indeed, the legislative history of the IEEPA provides numerous
examples of age-old declarations of emergency, that continued to
form the basis for presidential actions.75
In an attempt to prevent these perceived abuses of the emergency power, Congress subjected the President's exercise of emergency powers under the IEEPA to "strict procedural limits. ' 76
Specifically, the IEEPA provides that a two-house congressional
veto can terminate presidentially-declared emergencies and,
thereby, invalidate any regulations that the President has
promulgated pursuant to IEEPA emergency powers.7 7 However,
even if the use or threatened use of this veto authority by Congress could have served as a potent check on the breadth of the
President's emergency power under the IEEPA, 8 the Supreme

72. See supra text accompanying note 4.
73. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 10.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 5-6.
76. Id. at 11. For a description of other procedural limitations, see supra
note 19.
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b).
78. As a practical matter, the congressional power to terminate an TEEPA
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Court's recent ruling that one-house legislative veto provisions

are unconstitutional"8 probably renders the IEEPA's two-house
termination authority invalid as well.8 0 Thus, regulations that the
President promulgates pursuant to emergency authority under
the IEEPA, in all probability, are not subject to any significant
threat of a congressional veto that would terminate an IEEPA
emergency.
Moreover, the IEEPA does not impose any substantive constraints on the President's ability to exercise emergency powers.
Congressional concern over limiting the President's emergency
powers was tempered by Congress' desire to provide the President with authority "sufficiently broad and flexible to enable [the
President] to respond as appropriate and necessary to unforeseen
contingencies." 81 Consequently, Congress rejected "recommendations that it place a definite time limit on the duration of any
state of national emergency.

8

2

Thus, if the requisite procedural

83

steps are followed, the President may maintain in effect indefinitely the "national emergency" caused by the EAA lapse and
emergency has never been used and is ill-suited to restrain presidential regulatory authority during an emergency. By terminating an emergency to invalidate
certain regulatory actions that it found repugnant, Congress would also invalidate all other emergency regulations promulgated during the emergency and
prohibit the issuance of any further regulations. Thus, the overly broad nature
of this power may deter Congress from its use, particularly when the termination of the emergency will result in the same problem created by the lapse of the
EAA in the first place-namely, a window of time during which no controls over
exports or foreign boycott-related practices would be in effect. In short, even
though Congress dislikes specific regulations issued by the President during an
emergency, it may prefer to allow the presidential regulations rather than to
operate with no regulations at all, which is the inevitable result from its use of
the emergency termination power.
79. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80. A major constitutional defect of the one-house veto relied on by the
Court in Chadhawas its failure to comply with the Article I requirement that all
legislation be "presented" to the President for approval or disapproval. The
two-house termination authority in IEEPA suffers from the same constitutional
defect. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 ("The Court's Article I analysis appears to
invalidate all legislative vetoes irrespective of form or subject.") (White, J.,
dissenting).
81. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 19, at 10.
82. Id.
83. To maintain an emergency past its anniversary date, the President must
publish a Federal Register notice to that effect, 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (1982), and
continue submitting required periodic reports to Congress. 50 U.S.C. § 1703.
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thereby control exports for the duration of the lapse period. Indeed, even if Congress reauthorizes the EAA, the President can
veto the reauthorization bill, extend the IEEPA emergency, and
control United States export controls and foreign boycott regulations under the IEEPA for an extended period of time.
The IEEPA also places no substantive limitations on the President's ability to exercise emergency powers during a declared
emergency. In the face of Administration objections, Congress
specifically rejected a proposal that would have given it the authority to invalidate specific regulations issued by the President
during an emergency.8 4 Thus, Title II places no limitations on the
nature of the export controls and boycott-related restrictions that
it authorizes the President to promulgate.
Furthermore, no special constraints apply where a federal regulatory statute, replete with requirements and guidelines established by Congress, lapses. Although "the [Commerce Department] policies and regulations in effect prior to expiration were
kept in effect" during past EAA lapses, 5 the TEEPA neither requires the President to maintain the status quo nor bars the President from undertaking a complete overhaul of United States export control and foreign boycott regulations. Thus, a declaration
of a "national emergency" allows the President to disregard legally the requirements, standards, and guidelines of the EAA, and
to restructure completely the Commerce Department's regulations until Congress reauthorizes the EAA. 6

84. Early versions of IEEPA contained such a provision. See H.R. REP. No.
7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 206(b)(1) & (c) (July 13, 1977). Administration
officials opposed the provision on the grounds that it was unnecessary and unlawful-unnecessary because "Congress can always modify or revoke the President's emergency powers through legislation," and unlawful because it would
have violated "the constitutional principle of the separation of powers."
Markup, supra note 22, at 13 (testimony of Hon. C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs).
85. Hearings, supra note 20, at 124 (remarks of Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Dep.
General Counsel, Department of Commerce).
86. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 124 (remarks of Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.)) (observing that, under the President's emergency authority, the
executive branch "would claim freedom to regulate exports entirely at its own
discretion, without reference to any of the statutory guidelines provided by Congress in the [EAA]").
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B. Judicial Review: A Limited Constraint on Executive
Discretion Under the IEEPA
Although there is a greater opportunity for judicial review of
Commerce Department regulatory actions under the IEEPA than
under the EAA, the limited nature of this judicial constraint on
the regulation of exports and boycott-related practices during an
1EEPA emergency cannot serve to effectively limit the President's ability to make wholesale changes in the Regulations.
1. The Availability of APA Review
The EAA87 expressly provides that Commerce Department regulatory actions taken thereunder are not subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). s Thus, when
the EAA is in force, the Commerce Department's actions enforcing United States export controls and boycott-related restrictions,
such as denials of export license applications, could not be set
aside by federal courts on the grounds that they are arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law."9
87. EAA § 13(a), 50 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
88. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-553. The EAA's lapse also raises the question whether
Commerce Department rulemakings are now subject to the notice and comment
requirements of the APA and APA-type judicial review. The EAA expressly provides that any Commerce Department functions are exempt from the rulemaking requirements of section 553 of the APA. Because IEEPA does not contain a
similar exemption, Commerce Department rulemakings are theoretically subject
to APA requirements.
In practice, however, the Commerce Department and other agencies that exercise rulemaking functions under IEEPA can invoke the "foreign affairs" exemption in the APA, which renders the notice and current requirements of section
553 inapplicable to all "foreign affairs functions." APA § 553(a)(1). The Commerce Department has already invoked the APA's foreign affairs exception with
respect to the new export control regulations it has proposed or adopted under
IEEPA. See 49 Fed. Reg. 50,608, 50,609 (Dec. 31, 1984) (final rules on exports of
computer software and hardware); 49 Fed. Reg. 35,790, 35,791 (Sept. 12, 1984)
(proposed rules on new distribution license procedures).
Of course, because the foreign affairs exception only pertains to the APA's
notice and comment requirements, judicial review is still available. APA-type
review of informal rulemakings, however, is limited to determining whether the
newly promulgated rule being challenged is arbitrary and capricious, APA §
706(2)(A)-a standard which is difficult to meet. See also discussion, infra, of
other potential barriers to judicial relief (which apply to review of rulemakings
as well as license denials and other agency actions).
89. These four grounds are the basic APA standards of judicial review for
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Because the IEEPA does not contain any express exemption
from APA judicial review, the EAA's lapse raises the question
whether the Commerce Department actions taken under the
JEEPA are subject to the APA judicial review or still are exempt
by the EAA provision. The Western District Court of Washington
has considered this issue and, in Nuclear Pacific, Inc. v. Department of Commerce,9" concluded that APA-type review is available
for actions taken pursuant to the IEEPA. As noted by the court,91
the strong presumption in favor of judicial review over administrative actions can be overcome only by "a showing of 'clear and
convincing' evidence" that Congress intended to preclude such review. 92 Because the IEEPA does not have an express exemption
from review, and because its "legislative history does not clearly
and convincingly evidence Congress' intent" to either preclude
such review or "to permit the President" to do so by regulation,
the Nuclear Pacific court was unable to find that Congress in93
tended to preclude review.
2.

The Limited Utility of APA Review

Even assuming that APA judicial review is available under the
IEEPA, it is probably of limited utility. There are a number of
legal obstacles that substantially hamper the ability of the courts
to set aside the actions of all executive departments, including

final agency actions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). Commerce Department actions
taken under the EAA were probably subject to judicial review when they
presented federal questions, when the regulatory action being challenged was
alleged to be unconstitutional or in excess of its statutory authority. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331. The EAA contains no "clear and convincing" evidence that Congress meant to preclude the review of non-APA judicial challenges to the Commerce Department's regulatory determinations. Abbott v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140 (1967). Indeed, section 13(a)'s exclusive reference to the judicial review provisions of the APA is strong evidence that Congress intended to preclude only
APA-type review.
90. No. C84-49R (W.D. Wash. June 8, 1984).
91. Nuclear Pacific, slip op. at 11.
92. Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367,
379-80 (1962)).
93. Nuclear Pacific, slip op. at 11. Even assuming that Congress authorized
the President to preclude APA-type review under IEEPA by regulation, there is
no evidence that he has done so. As the court in Nuclear Pacific stated, "[t]he
regulations themselves do not unambiguously preclude review; they simply provide that the decision of the Assistant Secretary on an appeal 'shall be final.'"
Id., citing 15 C.F.R. 389.2(c)(2).
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the Commerce Department.
As a threshold matter, the courts probably will require prospective plaintiffs to exhaust all of their administrative remedies
before they can obtain judicial relief. The courts, therefore, will
review only "final," rather than "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate" administrative actions taken under the IEEPA.9 4
Thus, by the time the plaintiff has completely exhausted the administrative process, the intervening events may very well have
rendered the initial judicial challenge moot. For example, temporary denial orders issued in the early phase of a Commerce Department investigation, by definition, must be lifted by the time
the investigation is brought to a close.
Furthermore, there is a substantial chance that a reviewing
court would consider a plaintiff's claim against the Commerce Department to be nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine. Of course, the Nuclear Pacific court refused to apply this
doctrine to bar its review of the Commerce Department's decision
denying the plaintiff a license to export lead glass windows to India. While recognizing the inherent nonjusticiability of congressional and presidential policy decisions to "restrict the export of
goods and technology that could be used directly or indirectly in
the development of nuclear weapons," the court concluded that it
could review the legality of "regulations promulgated by the Department of Commerce to implement these decisions, and the
manner in which the regulations were applied to [the plaintiff]."9
The court then reviewed the plaintiff's claims that: (1) its exports
were not subject to the Regulations; (2) the Regulations were void
for vagueness; and (3) the Commerce Department's denial of its
license had been arbitrary and capricious. As noted in the decision, courts commonly review such claims "when agency action is
challenged," and the claims can "be resolved without encountering [political questions]." 9 6 Other courts, however, are not likely
to draw such a fine distinction and exercise "deference" to the
94. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Even in those rare circumstances when a court waives the
exhaustion requirement, it will only review a preliminary agency determination
if the plaintiff's interests in rapid "judicial resolution" of the claim outweigh the
interests of the agency in: (1) "making a factual record and exercising its discretion free of judicial intervention;" (2) "discouraging frequent flouting of the administrative process;" and (3) "correcting its own errors." Nuclear Pacific, slip

op. at 15.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 14.

1985]

EXPORT CONTROLS UNDER IEEPA

"policy decisions" of Congress and the executive branch, on the
one hand, while reviewing closely the Commerce Department's
regulations and decisions implementing such policies, on the
other. Indeed, since the Commerce Department frequently bases
its export licensing decisions on important foreign policy and national security considerations, the political question doctrine may,
contrary to Nuclear Pacific prove particularly nettlesome to
97
plaintiffs challenging license denials.
Even a plaintiff that clears these difficult hurdles still faces serious difficulties of proof. Judicial review under the APA must be
based upon the entire record before the agency when it made its
challenged determination." However, the Commerce Department
probably will refuse to certify the whole record to the court and
will reject plaintiff's discovery requests on grounds of foreign policy and national security. Thus, without the benefit of an examination of critical portions of the agency's record, a reviewing
court probably will defer to, rather than overturn, the challenged
executive branch decisions on export controls.99
Finally, once past these procedural hurdles, the plaintiff still
faces the difficult APA standards for invalidating agency action.
While there may be infreqent cases in which plaintiffs successfully demonstrate that the Commerce Department has violated its
own regulations, the typical challenge must demonstrate that the
Commerce Department's action was arbitrary and capricious, or
an abuse of discretion. A reviewing court will not disturb an
agency's determination under this standard unless the administrative record, as a whole, shows that the agency did not consider
all the relevant factors and made a "clear error of judgment."1 0 0
In practice, plaintiffs will find it diffcult to overcome the judicial
deference displayed toward agency actions under this APA

97. The political question doctrine is probably less of a barrier to judicial
review of the Commerce Department's actions enforcing foreign boycott-related
restrictions. The application of these precise regulations to a particular transaction is largely a technical legal matter and does not involve the exercise of discretion and making of policy judgments to the same extent as do many export
licensing decisions.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (sustaining refusal
of Air Force Secretary to disclose certain materials on ground that disclosure
would seriously hamper national security); WRIGHT & MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019 (1970).
100. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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standard. 101
Although such legal obstacles sharply limit the utility of APA
judicial review over Commerce Department actions taken under
IEEPA, the mere threat of such review may be a useful lever for a
Commerce Department supplicant. In this regard, knowledge of
the applicable APA standards probably will cause Commerce Department officials to consider all relevant factors and, at least, appear to act fairly. Moreover, in close cases, the Commerce Department may well err in favor of a prospective plaintiff rather than
face a probing judicial inquiry into its internal decisionmaking
process. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Nuclear Pacific court denied the plaintiff's claim only after it had reviewed:
(1) the Commerce Department's interpretations of its regulations;
(2) the record underlying its decisions; and (3) the views that had
been aired at interagency meetings. In short, from an exporter's
perspective, the threat of such extensive inquiry may have more
salutory effects on the Commerce Department's decisions than
the risk of losing the lawsuit that prompted the inquiry.
Of course, neither the actuality nor the threat of APA judicial
review compensates for or protects against the President's ability
to restructure entirely the Commerce Department's Regulations
pursuant to the IEEPA. Even drastic changes in existing export
controls and boycott-related regulations would not constitute arbitrary or capricious actions, or an abuse of discretion by the Administration provided that it sets forth a reasoned basis for its
actions. 02 Thus, unless future changes in the Regulations are ei-

101.

In Nuclear Pacific, the court reasoned that the Department had prop-

erly considered all the factors required by the Regulations in denying the plaintiff's license application, see 15 C.F.R. § 378.4, and that its "[w]eighing [of] the

factors.

. .

is a policy decision entrusted to agency discretion." Nuclear Pacific,

Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. C84-49R (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3, 1984). In
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that one rel-

evant factor-the availability of the product from a non-U.S. source-should
have resulted in the issuance of a license. The court concluded that plaintiff's
concentration on this factor "ignores the overwhelming evidence of the concern
felt by all the agencies involved over the other [relevant] factors." Slip op. at 9
(emphasis in original). This decision probably typifies the extent to which reviewing courts will not disturb discretionary agency actions under the "arbitrary
and capricious" rubric. Agency actions "committed to agency discretion by law"
are immune from judicial review under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
102.

See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018,

1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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ther irrational or promulgated without a stated basis, the courts
probably will uphold their validity.
C. The Regulatory Climate For Businesses
The magnitude of costs and uncertainty that regulated businesses will encounter as a result of the President's broad discretion to control exports under the IEEPA largely depends on how
closely the President follows the requirements and guidelines in
the EAA. Particularly during long EAA lapse periods, the executive branch is free to make major revisions in the Commerce Department's Regulations 03 which could deviate from the requirements and policies that Congress established in the EAA.
Although it is difficult to predict accurately which, if any, EAAmandated features of United States export controls will be discarded during a particular period of EAA lapse, it is possible to
identify the kinds of changes that, if made, could radically alter
the regulatory climate facing United States exports and other regulated businesses.
1. Export Controls
In the EAA, Congress established a number of export control
requirements that exporters view as salutary in nature. Specifically, the EAA mandated a multi-tiered system of licenses that
included: (1) "validated licenses" for specific exports to be applied for and approved in advance of the actual shipment of the
exported goods; (2) "qualified general licenses" that offer exporters the flexibility to make the multiple exports specified in their
applications; and (3) "general licenses" that authorize businesses
to export goods and technologies without application or advance
approval.104 Congress also established the general policy in the
EAA that the Commerce Department should grant qualified general licenses and general licenses to the "maximum extent practical" with national security and foreign policy objectivesY' 5
The statute further required the Commerce Department to
103. For example, the Commerce Department has proposed and is currently
holding hearings on substantial amendments in the regulation governing distribution licenses. See 49 Fed. Reg. 35,790 (1984) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§
373 and 376).
104. EAA § 4(a).
105. Id. § 5(e)(2), (3).
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consider the "foreign availability" of goods and technologies in
determining: (1) whether it should subject these articles to licensing requirements; and (2) if so, whether it should grant the exporter the required license.10 6 Thus, an advanced technology article that was freely available abroad might be exempt from the
Commerce Department's export controls. The EAA also established a number of requirements for the processing of export licenses by Commerce, including, inter alia, mandatory deadlines, 10 7 the involvement of other agencies in the licensing process,
and agency recordkeeping procedures. Any of these EAA-mandated features can be written out of the Regulations by the President in the exercise of the emergency authority provided by the
IEEPA. The President has the authority to eliminate statutory
deadlines, to restructure the licensing system restricting the availability of general licenses and qualified general licenses, and to
require the Commerce Department to limit an article's export
without regard to its foreign availability. In short, while operating
under the IEEPA, the President has the unbridled power to
adopt new features or extend current features of export controls
that could have serious adverse consequences for the business
community.
The President's broad authority under the IEEPA to unilaterally restructure United States export controls in a manner detrimental to the interests of United States exporters is vividly illustrated by President Reagan's recent decision to enhance the role
of the Defense Department in the review of export licenses. In
this regard for the practice established under the IEEPA (which
called for the Defense Department to scrutinize only exports to
communist countries),108 the President used his emergency au-

106. Id. § 5(f).
107. To ease the undue burdens on exporters caused by bureaucratic delays,
the EAA contained deadlines for the Commerce Department's license decisions,
which ranged anywhere from 90 to 240 days, depending on the involvement of

other federal departments and agencies and the degree of inconsistency contained in their recommendations on the proposed export. Id. § 10(f),(j).
108. Although the EAA, on its face, appeared to permit Defense Department
review of exports to noncommunist countries (see EAA § 10(g)(1) (authorizing

Defense Department review of exports to any nation to which exports are controlled on national security grounds)), the Commerce Department, in practice,

did not construe the statute to allow such review and only referred certain exports to communist countries to the Defense Department for its review. Thus,

even though the EAA may not, by its terms, have been intended to prevent what
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thority to authorize the Defense Department to review the license
applications for exports to those western nations that carry a significant risk of diversion to communist countries. 10 9 By unilaterally injecting the Defense Department into the process of reviewing "west-west" exports, the President has increased the
possibility that export license applications will be denied or seriously delayed. 110 There is little doubt that the President's unilateral decision will have adverse impact on international business
transactions.
Thus, the structure of United States export controls is far more
subject to the political vicissitudes of executive branch decisionmakers under the IEEPA than under the EAA. Whatever the Administration's present intentions or actions in a particular lapse
situation, the availability of the emergency authority to restructure export controls is likely to breed the political will to do so.
For example, the President could easily restructure export controls as a means of sending diplomatic signals or responding to
foreign policy developments. A downward turn in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union could easily lead to
far more restrictive export controls. Thus, export trade could be
held hostage to political ends with even more frequency under the
IEEPA than under the EAA.
Consequently, while the future shape of export controls under
the IEEPA is unknown, the potential harm to the business community from a long-term reliance on the President's emergency
powers is clear. The increased potential for massive and sudden

the President has done, in practice it served as such an impediment. Congress
has perceived the EAA as an impediment to an enhanced Defense Department
role in export licensing, as illustrated by the Senate proposal to amend § 10(g)
of the EAA to authorize expressly Defense Department review of west-west exports. See supra note 5.
109. This decision was made by the National Security Council in a classified
directive widely reported in the press. See Pentagon-Commerce Department

Dispute Resolved, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, § 3 at 1. The Washington Post,
Jan. 12, 1985, at 1.
110. The Undersecretary of Commerce, Lionel Olmer, recently told the Senate Banking Committee that Defense Department delays in reviewing and clearing export licenses cost businesses millions of dollars in lost sales. 4 Washington
Trade & Tariff Letter (Gilston), No. 43, at 2 (Oct. 29, 1984). "I would be happy
to give the committee chapter and verse on the disarray" caused by the Defense
Department, Olmer said. Id. He added that there were "enormous delays" in
Defense Department's reviews of export licenses, with the Defense Department
acting "well in excess" of the thirty-day EAA deadlines. Id.
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changes in the Regulations makes the exporters' task of planning
for future contracts, sales, and production more difficult. The increased role of the Defense Department in west-west licensing review has already made the likelihood of obtaining future licenses
for the export of large numbers of sensitive products more difficult to predict. These planning difficulties undoubtedly will increase the costs and risks of export businesses and will "chill"
export transactions in general. Thus, from a business perspective,
United States exporters are better off with the stable regulatory
environment of the EAA than with the uncertainties associated
with life under the IEEPA.
2.

Foreign Boycott-Related Restrictions

In enacting the EAA, Congress also outlined the basic structure
of the Commerce Department's foreign boycott regulations. Specifically, the EAA required the Commerce Department to establish both broad prohibitions on boycott-related conduct and narrow exemptions from these prohibitions which serve as "safe
harbors" for regulated persons. In implementing these prohibitions and exemptions, the Commerce Department has even identified particular provisions that, if included in contracts, letters of
credit, and other commercial instruments, would qualify for an
exemption."" Thus, to a large extent, compliance with the EAA's
restrictions on foreign boycott-related practices is a matter of ensuring that the standard contract provisions deemed legally permissible by the Department are utilized in place of other provisions whose legality is uncertain. Thus, the regulatory framework
for boycott-related transactions that was provided by the EAA
had a minimal effect on the structure of the majority of legitimate
overseas transactions and made compliance with the exemptions
relatively easy and inexpensive.
However, the lapse of the EAA and the maintenance of the
Regulations under the IEEPA, gives the Administration broad
emergency authority to restructure the foreign boycott regulations in ways that could create uncertainty in and, consequently,
impede overseas transactions." 2 The Commerce Department
111. See 15 C.F.R. § 369, Supps. 1-12.
112. Although it is highly likely that the Administration has the authority to
eliminate the EAA's prohibitions on boycott-related practices, which mainly apply to businesses' involvement with the Arab nations' boycott of Israel, political
considerations render such regulatory actions highly unlikely.
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could eliminate several of the safe harbor exemptions that the
EAA required the Commerce Department to include in the Regulations. Thus, businesses subject to the foreign boycott controls
probably were better with the certainty of the EAA than with the
instability of life under the IEEPA.
D. The Congressional Role in Regulating Exports
The unbridled authority of the President to restructure the
Regulations pursuant to IEEPA also may undermine the traditional role of Congress in regulating export transactions. The
Constitution plainly grants Congress the preeminent, if not exclusive, role in regulating exports, providing that Congress has the
plenary authority "to regulate Commerce . . . with foreign Na-

tions."113 In exercising this constitutional authority, Congress has
largely occupied the field of export controls through a series of
related legislation including, inter alia the EAA, the Arms Export
Control Act of 1978,114 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978.115

While the Constitution also confers "inherent powers" on the
President,116 including the exclusive authority "to speak or listen

as a representative of the nation" in foreign affairs, 17 these inherent powers probably do not include the right to unilaterally regulate exports. "[T]he power to regulate interstate commerce is not
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
114. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1982).
115. 22 U.S.C. § 3201. Other congressional enactments governing exports include: Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-996 (governing narcotics and dangerous drugs); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (governing nuclear materials and equipment); Natural
Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. 717B (governing natural gas); Federal Power Act of
1920, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(e) (governing electric power); Tobacco
Seed and Plant Exportation Act of 1940, 7 U.S.C. §§ 516-517 (governing tobacco
seeds and live tobacco plants); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§
1531-1543 (governing endangered fish and wildlife); Migratory Bird Treaty Act
of 1918, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543; Act for the Protection of Bald and
Golden Eagles, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (governing migratory birds and bald
and golden eagles); Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2401 (governing Antarctic mammals, birds, and plants); and 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 181-188 (governing unclassified technical data contained in patent applications).

116. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).

117. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19

(1936).
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among the powers incident to the Presidential office, but is ex' , Thus, the
pressly vested by the Constitution in the Congress."11
ability of the executive branch to establish restrictions on exports
is both derived from, and limited by, congressional delegations of
authority. 119

The IEEPA represents a commingling of congressional authority over the regulation of foreign commerce with presidential authority over matters relating to foreign affairs. 120 In fashioning
the IEEPA as a statutory framework for international emergencies, Congress attempted to achieve a delicate balance between
these executive and congressional powers, placing "necessary limits on the exercise of these emergency authorities by the President, while still providing him with necessary flexibility to react
to unforeseen emergencies in the future.

' 121

Whether the Presi-

dent's broad power to restructure export controls under the
IEEPA upsets this balance and undermines the plenary role of
Congress in regulating exports largely depends on the duration of
the EAA lapse period.
When as in the past, the EAA lapse period and the resulting
invocation of IEEPA is for short periods during which Congress
debates and eventually reauthorizes the statute, the traditional
role of Congress is enhanced. As discussed above, Congress
plainly intended the President to use the IEEPA's emergency
powers as a short-term, stopgap device. Rather than make the
EAA permanent, Congress chose to maintain the statute's temporary status and thus allow the President to use the IEEPA as a
"backstop" during the anticipated short-term EAA lapses. This
statutory interplay of the EAA and the IEEPA gives Congress the
118.

See Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d at 659; Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d

at 572. Nevertheless, some commentators have contended that "the President's
constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations gives him some incidental
power in related fields such as international trade." Morse & Powers, U.S. Export Controls and ForeignEntities: The Unanswered Questions of PipelineDiplomacy, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 537, 555 (1983). This argument takes on added legitimacy in emergency situations when the President can respond more quickly and
flexibly than Congress and the courts.
119. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

120. See Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d at 572; Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948).

121. Markup, supra note 22, at 9 (Statement of Cong. Jonathan B.
Bingham).
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ability to assert vigorously its constitutional role and reevaluate
the structure of export controls every several years.
Where the EAA lapse is of longer duration, as occurred recently, the role of Congress in structuring export controls can be
effectively undermined by the President's continued reliance on
the emergency authority under IEEPA. During a long EAA lapse
period, the President may unilaterally restructure existing export
controls and foreign boycott regulations- in disregard for the
congressionally established EAA requirements and guidelines.
Thus, the longer the duration of the lapse period, the greater the
chances are that the President will exercise the broad IEEPA authority to rewrite the existing Regulations. While Congress undoubtedly intended that its power to terminate an emergency by
concurrent resolution would be used to check the President's use
of the IEEPA, the probable invalidity of this device has upset the
IEEPA's delicate balance and left the President's broad powers
1 22
uncurbed
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE

EAA

AND THE REvISION OF THE

IEEPA

In sum, although the President's use of the IEEPA emergency
powers to regulate exports and boycott-related transactions is
lawful, both regulated businesses and Congress have substantial
interests in ensuring that a declared "national emergency" resulting from the EAA's lapse is one of short duration.
While regulated businesses probably can obtain APA judicial
review of final Commerce Department actions taken under the
122. The President's recent decision that authorized the Defense Department to review west-west license applications, see supra text accompanying
notes 110-12, graphically illustrates the erosion of Congress' control over exports
that the EAA lapse has caused. The Defense Department's role in export licensing is not a mere bureaucratic "turf" battle, but is a central issue in the debate
over precisely how restrictive export controls should be. Congress traditionally
played a major role in deciding how to allocate export control functions among
the various federal departments and agencies. The issue of whether the Defense
Department should be given additional review authority over west-west exports
was hotly contested in the 98th Congress in the course of its long debates over
the renewal of the EAA. Congress' failure to resolve this difficult issue was one
of the major reasons for the EAA's recent lapse. See supra note 5. Nonetheless,
the President, exercising IEEPA emergency powers unilaterally, authorized the
Defense Department review, and, thus, enhanced the role of the Defense Department in the export licensing process.
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IEEPA, this one benefit of the IEEPA, unavailable under the
EAA, neither compensates for, nor limits, the instability of the
IEEPA's regulatory environment provided by the IEEPA. The
ability of the President to unilaterally restructure export controls
exposes international business transactions to considerably more
risk under the IEEPA than under the EAA. Thus, the business
community probably is better off under any version of the EAA
enacted by Congress rather than under
a declaration of "national
123
emergency" pursuant to the IEEPA.

Congress also has an incentive to quickly reauthorize some version of the EAA after the statute has lapsed. The longer the lapse
period runs, the greater is the opportunity that exists for the
President to restructure export controls and repudiate the export
control policies established by Congress in the EAA. Thus, to
maintain its plenary role in regulating exports, Congress should
reauthorize the EAA forthwith once it has lapsed. Future Congresses should not allow controversies over certain specific export
control issues to prevent the reenactment of the overall structure
of export controls provided by the EAA with all deliberate
speed-which is precisely what happened during the recent EAA
lapse period. After lengthy deliberations, a joint House-Senate
conference convened by the ninety-eighth Congress reached
agreement on all but two controversial issues: the role of the Defense Department in reviewing exports to western nations and the
extent of controls over private bank loans and other transactions
involving South Africa. 124 For more than two years, these two issues essentially prevented Congress from reestablishing the basic
125
long-term framework for export controls in a reenacted EAA.
123. In fact, the fears of regulated businesses concerning the legislation to
reauthorize the EAA should be allayed by the EAA renewal legislation, which is
more favorable to exporters than its predecessor statute. For example, the Act
(1) creates a new "comprehensive operations license" which authorizes multiple
exports and reexports of technology and related goods between a domestic concern and its foreign affiliates where the exporter has an effective internal compliance system; (2) eliminates United States licensing requirements for exports of
certain relatively low-technology goods and technology to nations that are members of COCOM, a group of 15 nations which maintains multilateral export controls on exports to the Soviet bloc; (3) bars the imposition of export controls
solely on the basis that a product contains an embedded microprocessor; and (4)
makes the "foreign availability" of a product an even more important criteria in
licensing decisions. See Act, §§ 104(a), 105(b), 105(j), and 107.
124. See supra note 5.
125. In the event that compromise on any controversial issues proves diffi-
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Congress also should consider an amendment to the IEEPA to
ensure that its long term constitutional role in regulating exports
remains intact. The probable invalidity of the legislative veto and
emergency termination provisions in the IEEPA also have left
Congress unarmed against the President's ability to reshape export controls during a declared emergency.'" To remove this
threat to congressional authority over export controls, the IEEPA
should be amended to provide that during periods when the EAA
has lapsed, the President only is empowered to maintain intact
the system of export controls and boycott-related restrictions that
were in force when the emergency began (i.e., with no material
changes allowed during the duration of the emergency).127 In adcult, Congress, as it has done in the past, simply could extend the expired EAA.
Notwithstanding the lapsed statute's drawbacks, even the lapsed EAA is better
than continued reliance on IEEPA.
Alternatively, Congress could treat the South Africa controls separately by
severing them from the EAA reauthorization legislation. These controls are sufficiently important and unique to be properly handled through separate legislation. The EAA renewal legislation would, therefore, be considered on its own
merits, and its enactment would not be hampered by controversy over the South
African controls.
126. This is not to say, of course, that the President's broad authority to
regulate exports under IEEPA is unconstitutional. The executive branch's broad
authority to regulate exports under IEEPA is still a constitutional delegation of
the plenary authority of Congress to regulate foreign commerce. In enacting
IEEPA, Congress plainly set forth an "intelligible principle" that made it clear
when presidential action is proper. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928); Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d at 581; Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United
States, 275 F.2d 472, 480 (CCPA 1959). The intelligible principle is embodied in
IEEPA's express limitations on the President's ability to exercise emergency
powers. For a full discussion of these limitations, see supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text. These limitations prevent IEEPA's Title H powers from running afoul of the unlawful delegation doctrine. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d at
581; Unidyne Corp. v. Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705, 709 (E.D. Va. 1981).
127. Senator Heinz (R-Pa.) proposed two amendments to IEEPA during the
debate over renewing the EAA near the end of the 98th Congress that also warrant serious consideration.
The first would make it clear that IEEPA does authorize the imposition of
controls over exports. 130 CONG. REc. S143333-34 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984)
(Amendment 7119 to H.R. No. 4230, § 131(a)(3)). While IEEPA, as presently
drafted, does authorize such controls, see supra discussion in Section I, it would
do no harm to make this authority express, and, thereby, make it impossible for
a court to invalidate the entire system of Commerce Department export controls
currently authorized under IEEPA technologies for adversaries of the United
States.
The second Heinz amendment would exempt any executive branch export

108

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18.71

dition to preserving Congress' preeminent role in shaping export
control policy, this type of amendment would help ensure that
future EAA lapses will provide regulated businesses with a far
more stable regulatory environment for overseas transactions
than is now present under the IEEPA. 12 8

control actions taken under IEEPA from APA-type judicial review, thereby
making IEEPA consistent with the EAA. 130 CONG. REc. S14334 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 1984) (Amendment 7119 to H.R. No. 4230, § 131(c)). Given the limited utility of APA-type review for exporters, see supra Section H(B), such an amendment is desirable because it would prevent costly and unsuccessful court challenges brought at exporters' expense. For discussion regarding Nuclear Pacific,
see supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.

128. Congress also should consider restricting the President's authority to
regulate exports under IEEPA in one other respect. By its terms, IEEPA not
only allows the President to restrict exports during periods when the EAA has
lasped, but also allows the President to regulate exports when the EAA is in
effect. Thus, through this residual authority under the IEEPA, the President
can declare an emergency and regulate exports in a manner inconsistent with
the requirements or provisions of the EAA. For example, while Congress has
now limited the President's authority to impose foreign policy controls and
break contacts under the Act, the President, nevertheless, can defeat these restraints by bypassing the EAA and operating under IEEPA. Congress, thus,
should consider remedial legislation to ensure that the policies which it established in the EAA are honored and not undermined by the unbridled exercise of
the President's residual authority to regulate exports under the IEEPA.

